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8.1  Introduction 
Understanding the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) is im- 
portant for analyzing capital flows  and the industrial organization of  multi- 
national firms. Most empirical studies of FDI, however, have focused on case 
studies of  nontax factors in overseas investment decisions or on discerning 
simple correlations between some measure of direct investment and variables 
relating to nontax and tax aspects of  the investment decision. These studies 
have helped to assess the qualitative effects of changes in the underlying deter- 
minants on firms’ investment activities. It is more difficult to use those results 
for policy analysis. Our interest in investigating more precisely the links be- 
tween tax policy parameters and investment stems from a concern that policy- 
makers’ consideration requires a richer empirical analysis. 
At one level, this is a simple task. In theoretical studies, a number of authors 
have related tax parameters in “home” (residence) and “host” (source) coun- 
tries to financial variables such as the cost of capital or the ratio of the market 
value of the firm to the replacement value of its capital stock.’ Given such a 
relationship, one could apply familiar neoclassical investment models devel- 
oped to explain firms’ domestic investment decisions to estimate effects of tax 
parameters on outbound or inbound FDI. 
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1. See, for example, Alworth 1988. 
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In practice, this exercise is far from simple. Studies of effects of tax parame- 
ters on (generally inbound) U.S. FDI rely on investment flows calculated by 
the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. These data do not 
distinguish between new capital investment and acquisitions of existing assets. 
Given our interest in the effects of tax policy on FDI, this definitional problem 
is potentially serious.* 
We  are able to mitigate this problem and apply familiar investment models 
by using previously unexplored (for this purpose) panel data on outbound FDI 
by  individual subsidiaries of U.S. multinational firms, collected by  Compu- 
stat’s Geographic Segment file pr~ject.~  These firm-level data contain informa- 
tion on new capital investment overseas, enabling us to measure tax influences 
on FDI  more precisely and allowing us to focus on specific models of subsidi- 
aries’ new investment decisions. These models yield measures of the sensitiv- 
ity of FDI to home- and host-country tax parameters. 
8.2  Some Background on Empirical Studies 
Existing empirical studies of FDJ reflect researchers’ interest in industrial 
organization or taxation. Industrial organization inquiries have generally ig- 
nored tax considerations and analyzed FDI  as being governed by firms’ desire 
to exploit the value of ownership-specific assets (such as valuable intangibles) 
or location-specific advantages (related to sourcing or marketing). Empirical 
research has analyzed the roles played by  ownership-specific and location- 
specific variables in determining FDI. Public finance inquiries have focused on 
the role of differential tax treatment as determining the source and location of 
FDI,  holding constant nontax  determinant^.^ 
In this vein, a significant body of empirical research has emphasized effects 
of taxation on inbound FDI in the United States. This literature has generally 
examined simple relationships between capital flows and measures of after-tax 
rates of return or effective tax rates on capital income. 
Following  work  by  Hartman  (1984), several  studies have  used  annual 
aggregate data for inbound FDI financed by  subsidiary earnings and parent- 
company transfers of  funds. Hartman’s  approach assumes that subsidiaries’ 
dividend payouts are a residual in firm decisions. Payout ratios do not affect 
firms’ required rate of return on equity invested, and permanent changes in 
home-country tax rates do not affect dividend payouts or the cost of capital. 
In  the  context of  FDI, these  implications permit  Hartman  and  others to 
ignore effects of  (at least permanent changes in) home-country tax parame- 
2. In particular, Auerbach and Hassett (1993) have noted that neglecting the different tax treat- 
3. See Cummins and Hubbard 1995 for a discussion. 
4.  We review studies in both lines of inquiry in Cummins and Hubbard 1995. 
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ters  on  FDI  in  “mature” subsidiaries-that  is,  those paying  dividends to 
their parent firms.’ 
Hartman estimates the effects on U.S.  inbound FDI of changes in the after- 
tax rates of return received by foreign investors and by investors in U.S. capital 
generally, with the intent of measuring impacts of shifts in returns to new FDI. 
He finds that the FDI-GNP ratio increases as after-tax rates of return rise, and 
decreases as the relative tax rate on foreigners rises. These suggestive results 
indicate that taxes are an important determinant of FDI, and Hartman’s study 
provoked many subsequent rounds of replication and refinement.6 
Such studies are important advances on our understanding of  the effects 
of  taxation on FDI. A number of  concerns arise, however. An  obvious one 
relates to problems of  inference about tax effects on jinns’ decisions using 
such highly aggregated data. Second, nontax determinants of FDI are not mod- 
eled. Finally, the “foreign direct investment” data supplied by  the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis suffer two drawbacks, even accepting their level of aggre- 
gation: (1) they measure financial flows rather than new capital investment per 
se;  and (2) they are based on periodic benchmark surveys, raising the possibil- 
ity that FDI flows are more mismeasured the further the observation is from a 
benchmark year. 
8.3  Using Firm-Level Data to Study FDI 
8.3.1  Modeling Effects of Tax Parameters on FDI 
In a world of ideal data, assessing the impact of taxation on firms’ FDI deci- 
sions would be  straightforward. Consider a U.S. parent  firm deciding how 
much investment to pursue in a particular period. Intuitively, textbook neoclas- 
sical models of investment predict that the firm will invest until the value of an 
additional dollar of capital equals the cost of investing that dollar. 
Unfortunately, this benchmark approach is not particularly useful as a prac- 
tical guide to estimate effects of taxation on the levels of  firms’ FDI. First, it 
is difficult to develop a proxy for the incremental value of investing from avail- 
able data on financial market valuation, even under the best of circumstances. 
For FDI, a further complication arises because location-specific effects on the 
value of incremental investment in the subsidiary cannot be captured by using 
available financial data at the parent-firm level, and subsidiary-specific finan- 
cial market data are, of course, not generally available. 
To reduce these practical problems, we employ an empirical approach devel- 
5.  This approach is more suitably applied to firm-level data. The underlying model suggests that 
a mature subsidiary’s investment financed by retained earnings is unaffected by the home-country 
tax rate. This suggestion is not equivalent to a claim that aggregate investment out of retained 
earnings will not be affected by the home-country tax rate. 
6. See, for example, Boskin and Gale 1987; Newlon 1987; Slemrod 1990. 76  Jason G. Cummins and R. Glenn Hubbard 
oped to estimate effects on investment of  after-tax returns to investing with 
fewer informational requirements than in conventional models.’ Nonetheless, 
the approach still allows us to ask, given a change in a tax parameter, how does 
a  subsidiary’s return  on  additional investment change, and  how  does FDI 
change in response? 
Tax considerations can affect subsidiaries’ new capital investment decisions 
through two channels.*  First, host-country corporate income tax rates, invest- 
ment incentives, and depreciation rules affect the cost of  capital for foreign 
investors. This channel has been the focus of empirical analysis of effects of 
tax policy on domestic investment. 
A second channel through which tax policy affects FDI from countries with 
worldwide tax systems9  such as the United States is through variation over time 
and across firms in the “tax price” of  subsidiaries’ dividend repatriations to 
their parent firms. Within our approach, subsidiary dividend decisions and the 
cost of capital are not affected by permanent changes in the tax price of repatri- 
ations, though temporary changes can affect both repatriations and FDI.’O 
There are two sources of variation in the tax price of dividend repatriations. 
The first reflects variation over time in host- and home-country statutory corpo- 
rate income tax rates. The second reflects variation in foreign tax credit status 
(that is, excess credit or excess limit positions) both across firms and over time 
for a given firm.  Parents in an excess limit position owe residual U.S. corporate 
tax if the U.S. corporate tax rate exceeds the applicable foreign tax rate. Parents 
in an excess credit position owe no residual U.S. corporate tax. 
Our empirical tests analyze effects of changes in pretax returns to investing 
and in the tax parameters described above on FDI by U.S. multinational firms. 
Execution of these tests requires firm-level data on multinationals and their 
subsidiaries; we describe these data briefly below. 
7. For a technical description, see Cummins and Hubbard 1995. 
8. A different set of tax determinants is in general relevant for investment through acquisitions. 
See, for example, the discussion in Auerbach and Hassett 1993. 
9. By worldwide tax system, we mean that the home country taxes the worldwide income of 
multinational firms (generally when repatriated), but grants a foreign tax credit (subject to limi- 
tation). 
10. That is, we work within a framework known as the “trapped-equity” or “tax-capitalization’’ 
view of corporate dividends. A simple example illustrates this view. Suppose that a parent firm 
capitalizes a wholly owned subsidiary with an initial transfer of  equity capital. When the subsid- 
iary has growth opportunities and desired investment exceeds internally generated funds, the par- 
ent transfers additional funds to it. For a mature subsidiary, equity is “trapped”-earnings  exceed 
profitable investment opportunities, and the subsidiary repatriates the residual funds. Costly re- 
patriation can be delayed so long as the subsidiary has active investment opportunities abroad, but 
once those are exhausted, the subpart F rules prevent the use of passive investments to defer U.S. 
tax obligations. In this trapped-equity view, subsidiary dividend payouts are unaffected by perma- 
nent changes in their tax price. While this view is controversial in the context of dividend payouts 
from a domestic firm to its shareholders (owing to potential information or corporate control prob- 
lems), it is arguably less controversial in our application to dividends paid by majority- or wholly- 
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Table 8.1  Number of U.S. Foreign Subsidiaries in Sample 
United 

































































































Source: Authors'  calculations 
8.3.2 
The data set is constructed from the Compustat Geographic Segment file." 
Approximately 6,500 companies report information from their foreign opera- 
tions, segregated by geographic segment. Both U.S.- and foreign-incorporated 
firms report sales, operating income, and fixed assets. Up to four geographic 
regions are reported for seven years at a time. We  combine two seven-year 
panels to obtain a data set on outbound FDI by U.S. multinational corporations 
over the period 1980 to 1991. 
Table 8.1 indicates the number of U.S. foreign subsidiaries reporting infor- 
mation in the Compustat data. Countries for which Compustat reports data are 
Canada, the United Kingdom, (the former West) Germany, France, Japan, and 
Australia. While the number of subsidiaries reporting information vanes from 
year to year (generally growing over the period), we are able to obtain invest- 
ment and operating information on between 282 and 632 U.S. foreign subsidi- 
aries. 
Constructing Firm-Level Data on FDI 
8.3.3  Estimating Effects of Tax Parameters on FDI 
In  Cummins and Hubbard  1995, we estimated a model of  investment by 
subsidiaries of U.S.  multinationals that is derived from recent studies of deter- 
minants of domestic business fixed investment. Using the panel data described 
11. Geographic segment disclosures are mandated by Statement of  Financial Accounting Stan- 
dards No. 14: Financial Reporting of  Segments in a Business Enterprise (SFAS 14), issued in 
1976. SFAS 14 was designed to provide information useful for evaluating the nature of the firm's 
investment and production decisions. SFAS 24 requires firms to disclose information about foreign 
sales, income, and fixed assets if  foreign operations account for at least  10 percent of a firm's 
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above on investment by U.S. subsidiaries in Canada, the United Kingdom, Ger- 
many,  France, Australia, and Japan, we tested the hypothesis that host- and 
home-country tax parameters should be included in the model, and estimated 
the responsiveness of subsidiary investment to pretax returns and tax param- 
eters. 
Our results can be described straightforwardly in two steps. First, we reject 
conclusively the  simple notion  that  “taxes don’t  matter”-both  host-  and 
home-country tax parameters should be included in the correct specification 
of the subsidiary’s investment model. Second, we estimate a significant  respon- 
siveness of firm-level FDI to the tax-adjusted cost of capital. Our results sug- 
gest that each percentage-point increase in the cost of  capital leads to a 1-2 
percentage-point decrease in the annual rate of investment (investment divided 
by the beginning-of-period capital stock).l*  Changes in the cost of capital can 
reflect, among other things, the host- and home-country tax variables we dis- 
cussed in section 8.3.1. 
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that permanent changes in 
the tax price of subsidiary dividend repatriations do not affect the cost of capi- 
tal or FDI by dividend-paying subsidiaries. This result allows us to offer some 
observations about the extent to which the U.S. system of taxing multination- 
als’ income corresponds to norms of capital-export neutrality or capital-import 
ne~tra1ity.l~  Hartman (1984) and others have noted that, for dividend-paying 
subsidiaries, permanent changes in the home-country (U.S.) corporate tax rate 
should have no effect on FDI financed out of subsidiary retained earnings-a 
“capital-import neutral” result for these firms. This finding does not carry over 
precisely in our framework, since changes in the parent firm’s foreign tax credit 
status’also affect the tax price of repatriations. Hence, Hartman’s result holds 
in the case for which the parent’s foreign tax credit position is not expected 
to change. With expected changes in foreign tax credit status, capital-export 
neutrality may prevail. Similar examples can be constructed for “immature” 
subsidiaries, those financing initial investment using parent equity  transfer^.^^ 
To summarize, the US. tax system creates potentially complex effects of tax 
parameters on overseas investment decisions, and those effects can vary sig- 
nificantly across firms. 
12. These estimates are broadly consistent with those reported for firm-level fixed investment 
in the United States (see Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard,  1994a) and with those for firm-level 
domestic fixed investment in other OECD countries (see Cummins, Harris, and Hassett,  1995; 
Cummins, Hassztt, and Hubbard 1994b). 
13. Capital-export neutrality results when the home country’s tax parameters do not distort a 
domestic investor’s decision between investing at home or abroad. Capital-import neutrality results 
when domestic and foreign investments in a country have equivalent overall investor tax treatment. 
In practice, no industrialized country’s tax system corresponds precisely to the norms of capital- 
export neutrality or capital-import neutrality. The U.S. Treasury has generally argued for capital- 
export-neutral policy benchmark, though the U.S. system’s allowance for deferral of tax on over- 
seas profits until  repatriated  (among  other  considerations)  is  inconsistent with capital-export 
neutrality. 
14. We review such examples in detail in Cummins and Hubbard 1995. 79  Is Foreign Direct Investment Sensitive to Taxes? 
8.4  Conclusions and Directions for Future Research 
Our study represents a first step in a research program to use microdata on 
multinational firms’ overseas investment decisions to study the determinants 
of FDI, especially those related to tax policy. The panel data that we use on 
FDI of  subsidiaries of U.S. firms permit us to focus on “new investment,” a 
focus not possible with studies that use aggregate data. These data allow us to 
test models of  investment decisions that yield informative estimates of effects 
of tax parameters on FDI. 
We believe we have been successful in two respects. First, we have extended 
conventional investment models to accommodate a wide range of  tax influ- 
ences on FDI decisions. Second, our empirical results cast significant doubt on 
the simple notion that taxes don’t matter for US.  firms’ FDI decisions. Indeed, 
tax parameters influence FDI in precisely the ways indicated by standard models 
of investment. 
We  are pursuing three extensions. First, we  are adapting our analysis to 
study effects of tax policy on FDI in the United States by foreign firms. Sec- 
ond, we plan to examine whether, as a result of exchange rate shifts, revalu- 
ations of  firms’ profits in  terms of  host-country currency affect their FDI. 
Finally, we will incorporate imperfect competition and intangible assets more 
explicitly in our approach. 
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